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ABSTRACT A non-conventional change of government occurred in Hungary in 
2010. The winner of the election, party-alliance FIDESZ-KDNP, which controlled 
more than two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament, transformed the 
Hungarian constitutional system radically and with unprecedented rapidity. The 
so-called invisible constitution of 1989 was replaced by a new Basic Law. The new 
holders of power changed the structure and management of state administration. 
There were also fundamental shifts in the system of public education and in the 
financing of the health care system. We witnessed the introduction of new and 
until-now never-applied approaches and tools for regulating the economy and 
the taxation system. Moreover, the new government introduced systemic changes 
in terms of how the poor and the unemployed were supported and modified the 
legal and financial status of local governments. Since 2010, the share of the state 
sector has increased in the Hungarian economy.  How did the grand entrepreneurs 
behave, and what strategies did they use in this radically modified socio-economic 
environment?
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RESEARCH HISTORY
Our team2 started a piece of quantitative research on the creation and 
development of the new capitalist strata in post-socialist Hungary nearly 
twenty years ago. There were two stages. In the first round (1999-2001), the 
main sources of information were forty-eight in-depth interviews which 
were amended and controlled through the content analysis of documents and 
newspapers. Our interview partners were owner-managers of fast-growing or 
efficiently consolidated large and medium-sized companies and businesses. 
Mainly because of their outstanding performance, these owner-managers were 
influential in the Hungarian economy at the end of the first decade of the post-
socialist transition.
In this research project (and especially in the instructions for interviews) we 
focused on the micro- and macro-economic factors which would have been the 
main preconditions for successful post-socialist entrepreneurship. We carefully 
analyzed decisive events and turning points in family- or life histories which 
related to this process. Based on the interviews, we tried to understand the 
features which mobilized and speeded up the development of this phenomenon. 
Furthermore, we revealed diverse types of life stories and of aspirations (social 
roles), and specifically different structures of accumulated knowledge and skills 
as well. These results allowed us to evaluate the development of this emerging 
social group and place it in the context of the revival and rebuilding of the social 
functions of the Hungarian grand bourgeoisie.3  
We started a follow-up piece of research about ten years after, in 2008.4 
The core of our research plan was the idea to conduct a second round of 
in-depth interviews with our former partners. Accordingly, we undertook 
thirty-five follow-up interviews in 2009-2011. There were thirty-three cases 
in which we were able to meet our former interview partners again. In 
the other two cases, when our interlocutor had died in the meantime, we 
consulted with the owner-managers of the (descendant) company. We tried 
to reconstruct the stories of those who refused to contact us or had passed 
away. In these cases we used internet and media sources and communicated 
with successors. 
2  Members included Julia Szalai, Ágnes Vajda and Mihály Laki. To our great sorrow, Agnes died in 
1998. Following her desire, we continued with the research. 
3 The main results of the research have been summarized in: Mihály Laki – Júlia Szalai (2006) 
4  The research plan was completed in 2008, field work started in 2009, and the final version of the 
research report was published in 2012. Our research was supported by the Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund (Tíz évvel később: magyar nagyvállalkozások az Európai Unióban OTKA 77918).
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The majority of our old-new interview partners were over forty years old during 
the first years of the post-socialist transition, so on good grounds we assumed 
that some of them would have already retired, or begun the complicated process 
of withdrawing from work in the period of our follow-up research. Furthermore, 
we expected that the methods and opportunities for company establishment 
would have significantly changed after the end of the last wave of  privatization 
in Hungary (1997-1998). These two developments indicated the need for the 
involvement of a comparison group of younger Hungarian entrepreneurs into 
our research. Based on our earlier-used interview plan (including its thematic 
blocks), interviews were undertaken with thirty-one younger entrepreneurs 
(owner-managers of large or medium-size companies) in 2009-2012. Their 
common feature was that their businesses had started only since 2000 (thus we 
called them the ‘younger’ sample).
UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR UPSHOT
Who lost a significant share of economic power and social influence? 
In the last pages of our first book, we stepped away – perhaps unwisely – 
from our position as descriptive researchers, and evaluated and calculated 
the hopefully positive impacts of this group of entrepreneurs on Hungarian 
society, saying that “The strategy of adaptation has again been successful, 
as the earlier statistical data indicate, and domestic grand business has been 
able to maintain its share and its position. In the light of such renewed success, 
EU accession seems to promise easier conditions and moving forward, 
rather than collapsing. Obviously, it is a new phase with new challenges 
for adaptation, but after all, this is the very area in which Hungarian grand 
entrepreneurs have for decades performed outstandingly well” (Laki-Szalai 
2004 p. 228).
Unfortunately, our forecast, which was made in the first years of the twenty-
first century, needed significant modification. The evolution in the social position 
of the new strata of great entrepreneurs was not permanent (as we had claimed) 
but only provisional. We demonstrated in a second book (Laki-Szalai, 2015) 
that a significant component of this social group (the ‘old’ ones) – members of 
which had started businesses mostly during the first years of the post-socialist 
transition – had lost their influence and economic power by the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.
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Table 1.  Performance measured by company development (1990-1999) 
Size of company at 
start-up
Size of the company in the time of the interview
Total
Small Medium-size Large
Small - 15 11 26
Medium-size - 7 6 13
Large - - 7 7
Uncertain - - 2 2
Total - 22 26 48
The ‘old ones’ 1 had accumulated managerial experience and business 
connections at big state-owned companies and cooperatives, or in the illegal 
and legal private sector of the socialist system. Ten years after, we learned more 
about the drawbacks of this development, and recognized more precisely the 
negative returns of this hereditary endowment: i.e., the risk of the excessive 
accumulation of skills, knowledge and connections accumulated in the socialist 
era. We tried to understand that the failures were caused not only by the 
depreciation and obsolescence of this ‘heritage’. 
We identified specific ‘traps’, and typical cases of slow and inadequate 
adaptation. The sources of the fast growth of the first years of transition (the 
abundantly available stock of buildings and machines after privatization, 
the markets inherited or received from defunct state-owned companies, the 
consciously created familiar traits of the workplace) became barriers to further 
successful development. The old ones reluctantly fired their surplus (inefficient 
and incapable of learning) labor force, postponed technological modernization, 
and for them market change caused by saturation or by excess demand was 
mostly unusual. It is for these reasons that the performance of those members of 
the original sample weakened remarkably in the first decade of the new century. 
We were able to evaluate the performance of forty-three companies from the 
forty-eight in the years after 2000 based on our follow-up interviews, media 
news and information available on company home pages (Table 2).
Table 2 Performance measured by company development (2000-2008)
Size of company at 
start-up
Size of company at time of interview
Total
Small Medium-size Large
Small - - - -
Medium-size 9 8 3 20
Large 6 2 15 23
Uncertain - - 2
Total 15 10 18 43
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Interviews from the second round regularly contain reports about the 
disappointment of the older owner-managers. Not only did their stock of 
property diminish or disappear, but a significant number of them had withdrawn 
from public life and/or lost their previous social roles and functions since the 
time of first interview. The ambitions of these excellently performing, skilled 
owner-managers had in many cases changed over the last decade. Instead of 
trying to be symbols of excellence, they had sought to eliminate their image 
of disagreeableness, consciously mingled with the crowd, and stressed their 
conformity. 
We emphasized in the second book the far-reaching impacts of this radical 
change of attitude that shows the apparent abdication of the promise and 
feasible-looking social role of this cohort, and of their plans to improve society. 
We should add that we found that the new sample were already thinking on a 
smaller scale, and more about strengthening family frameworks. In this sense, in 
the circles of mid-size and larger entrepreneurs there are few representatives of 
the (big) bourgeois’ attitude of wishing to have a say in the affairs of the country. 
Our research highlighted multi-dimensional and deep differences between the 
old and new samples: it is as if these two groups do not belong to the same social 
strata. More precisely, as if they represented two clearly distinct status-groups. 
This shows how the norms and patterns represented by the old ones were not 
being followed by the others. The new ones are moving differently, in different 
spaces, and they have different aspirations and values. However, in order to 
exemplify the strata of big entrepreneurs, their common values, aspirations and 
behavioral patterns would have to be aligned with the attitudes of the (large) 
bourgeois’ of wishing to have a say in the affairs of the country. The norms of 
the citoyen, who is ready to do something for the community, have somehow 
disappeared.
Not independent from this, displays of ideological attitudes have become more 
‘swampy’. Remarkably well-adapted to the changes in the ideological-political 
content of ordinary language (discourse), interviews with the old sample often 
contained indicative concepts, phrases, and figures of speech about so-called 
national discourse. We thus claim that ideological-political confessions have 
become externalized, and when necessary, easily commutable. However, 
dissemination of the norms of the strata of the former bourgeois would require 
robust and recognizable language. The delay in creating and refining such a 
language suggests a behavioral ethos which is based only the self-definition of 
the private person and a kind of responsibility based on the boundaries of the 
private personality. 
We recognize the deepening controversy about ‘relations with the rest of the 
world’ as being among the limitations of the sample, applying to (big) bourgeois’ 
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attitudes as well. It is as if the middle-size and larger entrepreneurs we 
interviewed had adapted to the newest wave of xenophobia which overwhelmed 
Hungary in the last year of the republic in 1989 (Sik 2012). Europe at that time 
was not yet the desired point of reference, or the depository of ideas about 
freedom and welfare, but was becoming a source of unpleasant burdens. Our 
interview partners mentioned the over-bureaucratic nature of the Union, and its 
pointless but qualified rules. They complained about the unequal distribution 
of European benefits among member states. They cited as the cause of their 
personal failure multinational companies – representing ‘foreigners’. Compared 
to such events, any counterbalancing advantages of the Union were minimized. 
Among these subordinated factors are the knowledge that can be obtained from 
these foreign owned-managed companies of production-culture, organization 
management, and labor policies at a company level.
Meanwhile, members of the old and the new sample rely on foreigners very 
often. We see that they enjoy the freedom of movement and travel – which 
involves opportunities for learning, recreation and cultural facilities. But we 
must also recognize that, along with the pragmatic mention of these advantages, 
comes a strong demand for national isolation.  Freedom becomes a private good, 
but in terms of public interest, “abroad” is very often a source of disappointment 
and suggests barriers. This attitude renounces the former desire for the adoption 
of European standards and rejects the conception that Hungarians as European 
citizens could create a new identity. And through this capitulation, respondents 
recognize implicitly the provincial character of the country – and of the national 
community – preferring to respect the long-term peripheral status of Hungary. The 
promising process of the construction of the elite roles of the great entrepreneurs 
practically disappeared before the radical change of the political system in 2010.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF 1989 
We did not consider that the republic of 1989 would fall in the previous two 
stages of our field work. Moreover, our interview partners (large entrepreneurs, 
owner-managers) had not incorporated the above-mentioned institutional and 
regulatory changes into their expectations in business plans.
We did not undertake field work after 2012. Based on internet, media sources 
and on personal communication, we used secondary information only at this 
stage. Collection of information was focused but not restricted to our previous 
interview partners, but we documented news reports and interviews with other 
owner-managers of companies with a Hungarian majority share. We preserved 
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the anonymity of our previous interview partners, thus stories and examples 
were collected from outsiders.
Shrinkage of output and exit from the market:  
earlier developments continue
The withdrawal from the business sector of older (retirement-age) owner-
managers continued over the last 3-4 years. In some cases, companies were 
passed on to children, or to a selected successor, and owner-managers retired. 
These exits, company sales, or significant cases of shrinkage were driven by 
strong constraints, not by free and voluntary calculations, or by the desire to 
carefully maximize income, in most cases.
Some constraints, such as difficulties with sales and liquidity problems, 
are of market origin: the typical business failures of the old sample repeated 
themselves. A business plan which incorporated a miscalculation about growth 
in turnover caused the collapse of Ulpius Publishing House (F. Szabó 2015). A 
similar outcome occurred on the same market when another great entrepreneur/
owner-manager, Mr. Dezső Matyi, failed to accurately estimate the growth rate 
of the Hungarian book market, causing serious liquidity problems at Alexandra 
Publishing Company (F. Szabó 2014, 2014a, Hamvay 2012). Similar market 
failures occurred in other industries such as road building (Vitézy 2013).
(Partly) new reasons for failures and retirements
Another significant reason for these business failures and shrinkages was the 
direct influence of politicians, or the buying pressure of companies with close 
relationships to the governing political coalition. For example, Magyar Építő 
Zrt. (Hungarian Construction Ltd.) was bought by a businessman who belongs 
to the prime minister's circle of friends. “Mr. Tibor Tolnay, the previous owner 
of the company, did not tell us the price at which – according to him – he would 
be satisfied. At the same time, he made it clear that nothing would make him 
leave. He considered it most important that the 108 employees would have a safe 
working place under the management of the new owners” (Gépnarancs 2015). 
Another owner-manager in our sample inaugurated a collaborative project with 
a newly elected, FIDESZ-delegated mayor. However, a week later the local 
government terminated the deal and gave the business to someone else. Events 
and stories like these contributed to the change in the business climate.
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Mostly, it was the so-called Simicska-case that convinced entrepreneurial 
society that the redefined procurement policy of the FIDESZ-controlled 
Hungarian state would decisively influence the income and profit of numerous 
companies; moreover, in a lot of cases such decisions would practically define 
the future development of these companies and the success of their owners. 
The Közgép-conglomerate, a network of companies which are/were owned-
managed by Mr. Lajos Simicska, a former close friend and dorm-mate of the 
prime minister, won numerous public orders for many years (Bednárik-Nyusztay 
2015). The Hungarian business community watched with interest when, after 
the eruption of a serious personal-political conflict between Simicska and the 
prime minister, Közgép lost all procurement tenders that affected this company-
network. This development influenced negatively the profitability and the 
market share of the Simicska-owned conglomerate. The peak of the new form 
of negative discrimination happened when this company group was excluded 
from the entire Hungarian procurement process for years because of so-called 
irregularities with an application which was submitted as part of a tender for the 
construction of a port at Gönyű (a small town on the bank of the Danube in West 
Hungary). Some of this company network’s earlier contracts were also cancelled 
in the meantime. The ‘Simicska Empire’ was forced to make layoffs, and its 
financial position has weakened significantly since the Simicska-Orbán affair 
(Kapitány-Szabó-Varga 2015). At the same time, companies and company-
chains owned and managed by Lőrinc Mészáros, a friend and village neighbor 
of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, grew rapidly in terms of turnover and profit, 
elevating Mészáros (formerly a local village plumber and small businessman) 
onto the list of the 100 richest Hungarians in less than two years (Lencsés 2015). 
Companies belonging to the prime minister's son-in-law won a long list of local 
government tenders, in a majority of cases being the only applicants. Such 
stories about the punishment-and-reward activities of the state sent a message 
to the Hungarian business community that success on the procurement market 
was no longer connected to performance, but political contacts. More precisely: 
political dependency appears to be higher in Hungary than it was before 2010. 
On markets in which the share of the state procurement is traditionally 
marginal or collateral we may also recognize significant regulatory changes 
which have variously affected the performance of companies. We can mention 
here, among others, bank nationalizations and the introduction of industry-
specific taxes in some key sectors of the Hungarian economy. The re-regulation 
of the tobacco retail trade provoked the biggest reaction from the public and 
market players in the last few years. The re-regulation of this market involved 
not only the nationalization of the tobacco retail trade, but the imposition of 
mandatory concession contracts for new market entrants (Laki 2015). 
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The tobacco retail trade story is not an exception. The government has 
radically modified regulations which have affected the listing and power ranking 
of market players on the textbook market (Átlátszó 2013). Similar interventions 
have taken place in the markets for company liquidator agencies, video games, 
and the market for the construction design of state projects. Partial-temporary 
restructuring of the pharmacy market was also on the agenda (Laki 2015).
Circulating news about the further restructuring of markets strengthened 
pessimistic expectations and increased the uncertainty of the Hungarian business 
community. For example, news about the reorganization of the alcohol (wine, 
beer, and spirits) trade along the lines of the tobacco market regulation was in 
the air (Index 2013a). The prime minister has also confirmed that the series of 
nationalizations and market restructurings are far from over: “As for the prime 
minister, there will be heavier matters in the future. They will provoke similar 
debates, because – as the prime minister said – ‘we have managed such steps 
of reorganizing the market in this cycle, and will in the future as well. If we are 
convinced that we can give a chance to small and medium-sized companies, 
then, if necessary, we will intervene, and reorganize things – within the law, 
and respecting the European rules about competition, of course’” (Index 2013b).
Experiments with adaptation 
The so-called national oligarchs – those who are supported by the FIDESZ 
government – grab at the above-mentioned opportunities and take advantage of 
the selectively supported expansion of the market, which seems to be one of the 
specific features of the ‘System of National Cooperation’ (Nemzeti Oligarchák 
Újgazdasági Mechanizmus 2014). But what kind of strategies were used or 
tested by members of our sample? How did the old and the new sample adapt to 
these new conditions?
Besides the previously documented (sometimes unusual) market exits and 
shrinkages, a few  respondents from these two groups have carefully adapted 
to the new political conditions. The simplest case was when one of the new 
respondents successfully invited the prime minister as a guest of honor to a 
factory inauguration ceremony. 
The behavior of those entrepreneurs who have transferred the center of 
gravity of their businesses to other countries in the last two years may be more 
important in terms of impact (only a few similar instances of this took place in 
the past). In other words, it is not only labor, but capital which has ‘emigrated’ 
from Hungary too. For example, one of the members of our sample joined an 
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international product consortium. Some sentences from the great entrepreneur 
György Gyattyán – who did not belong to either sample – clearly illustrate 
the reason for and approaches to relocating businesses and businesspeople 
nowadays: “My businesses are working through the internet. My company’s 
income is not derived from Hungary. I live abroad. I do not attend private 
receptions here. I have no insider connections. I am not familiar in some circles, 
so to say. Unfortunately, I missed the chance to build connections and a name 
for myself. This should have started five years ago” (Várkonyi 2014). 
One emblematic figure from the ‘old’ days, Sándor Demján (who was not a 
member of our sample either), who plays a significant public role in contemporary 
Hungary, underwent a similar journey. Because of liquidity problems, 
subcontractors prosecuted one of his companies (Fekete 2015). Demján “sold a 
significant part of the mortgage-portfolio of his successful company Trigránit. 
The buyer was the American company TPG which is practically unknown in 
Hungary, although it is considered among the gigantic investment companies” 
(Népszabadság 2015b).  This step made Demján’s investment policy even more 
obvious: “in the last years the Trigránit-group typically increased their share 
of property abroad because the business climate of Hungary did not favor such 
investments” (Vitézy 2015 p. 54).
CAREFUL COMMENTS ABOUT THE FURTHER 
OPPORTUNITIES OF OUR INTERVIEW PARTNERS
The future of the institutional and market structure which has been shaped 
by the new power holders since 2010 is uncertain. In other words, we cannot 
currently describe it as a self-sustaining system which is able to self-correct. But 
we may offer the following weak but plausible argument: the above-collected 
and presented anecdotes about the events and stories of the last 2-3 years rather 
suggest that the regulative activities and economic policy of the new regime, 
and the responses of business people to these developments, are more favorable 
to the spread of a mentality (and relationships) of dependency, rather than to the 
strengthening of free and independent citizenship.
Unfortunately, there are no reasons for modifying the following sentences 
contained in the book we published in 2013: “The promising start to the elite 
roles of the great entrepreneurs has nowadays dissipated. It seems to us that 
their disappearance is more or less irreversible.  But a pragmatic social-political 
reform program cannot be achieved without strengthening value-creating elites. 
Therefore, the often-mentioned hopeless situation of the country is becoming 
permanent. It is not the task of this study to consider the alternatives. But we may 
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state, perhaps, that we cannot imagine how the marginalization of the country 
in the European space may be halted and a path of modernization developed 
without the emergence of a strata of mid-level and larger entrepreneurs which 
relies on its own strength. Which trustfully and, in perspective, feels that it has 
found its place again, and has enough spirit and energy to create a role for itself 
as the driving force of our country” (Laki-Szalai 2015 p. 208-209).
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